Foreign entry in Turkey's banking sector, 1980-97 by Denizer, Cevdet
POLICY  RESEARCH  WORKING  PAPER  2462
Foreign Entry in Turkey's  One remarkable  consequence
of Turkey's  financial Banking Sector, 1980-97  liberalization  has been the
large number of foreign
Cevdet  Denizer  banks  entering the banking
sector.  Their  effect?  They
appear to have increased
competition and to have
reduced the overhead




Europe and Central Asia Region

















































































































dPOLICY  RESEARCH  WORKING  PAPER  2462
Summary findings
Despite high and volatile inflation, a record number of  interest margin, overhead expenses, and return on assets
foreign and local banks entered Turkey's banking sector  (all expressed as a percentage of total assets). He finds
after the country relaxed rules about bank entry and  that:
generally eliminated controls on interest rates and  - Foreign bank ownership is related to all three
financial intermediation  in 1980. The country's financial  performance measures.
integration with the rest of the world took a big step  o  Foreign bank entry reduced the overhead expenses
forward with the opening up of the capital account in  of domestic commercial banks, strengthening profits.
1989. Capital inflows rose significantly, and the financial  - Despite their small scale of operations, foreign
system became increasingly linked with external markets.  banks entering the sector had a strong effect on
Denizer examines one dimension of liberalization: the  competition. But the market could use more
impact of foreign banks entering the financial sector.  competition.
Between 1980 and the end of 1997, 17 foreign banks  o  There are strong indications that foreign banks had
and a number of new local banks entered the sector.  a positive impact on financial and operations planning,
Denizer investigates how these banks' entry into the  credit analysis and marketing, and human capital.
sector affected performance based on three measures: net
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Since June 1980 Turkish financial markets have been greatly opened up and
liberalized. Reforms were implemented as part of a structural adjustment program to
switch to an outward-oriented growth strategy. They had two key elements: the first was
the elimination of controls on interest rates, and a significant reduction in directed credit
programs; the second was the relaxation of entry barriers into the banking system to
promote competition and increase efficiency. There were also measures to develop equity
and bond markets.  In 1984 Turkish residents were allowed to open foreign currency
accounts in banks, increasing product variety and services. This process culminated in the
opening up of the capital account in 1989, further facilitating international trade in goods
and financial services.
These were important changes considering the earlier constraints on financial
markets. Interest rates had been controlled since the 1940s, in line with the state-led
development strategy based on import substitution, and they had been changed only five
or six times until 1978. This led to non-price competition by banks already in the system
through opening up of new branches. Directed credit programs absorbed almost 75
percent of loanable funds. Entry, especially after early 1960s, had been highly restrictive.
This situation, coupled with the exit of a large number of banks during the 1960-80
period, resulted in a concentrated market dominated by large private and public banks
with extensive branch networks. Of the 42 banks in 1980, only four were foreign.  Hence,
prior to 1980, the bank-dominated financial sector was uncompetitive and inefficient with
a limited range of products (Denizer, 1997). The government strictly controlled the
capital account.
2There have been marked changes in the financial sector following the
liberalization of financial prices and policies. While there were occasional setbacks
during 1980-89, the trend has been towards liberalization. By 1989, interest rates were
market-determined. This halted the decline in financial intermediation ratios observed
prior to 1980 and contributed to financial deepening. The new regulatory regime
attracted a large number of banks, both Turkish and foreign, and sectoral concentration
decreased.  The Istanbul Stock Exchange was reopened and, over time, became an
integral part of the financial system. Government securities began to be auctioned in
1985 and quickly became an important portion of the stock of financial assets. The
interbank market began to operate in 1986 allowing banks to lend and borrow from each
other for overnight facilities.
What has been remarkable about the financial opening-up episode in Turkey has
been the entry of foreign banks in large numbers. By 1990, there were 23 foreign banks
in the system meaning 19 new entries, matching the number of de novo entries by the
Turkish banks. Interestingly, however, there have been very few studies of their impact
on the Turkish financial system. Bhattacharya (1993) is one of the few studies that looks
at the issue, considering Turkey, in addition to Pakistan and Korea.  He finds that foreign
banks have been instrumental in attracting external capital to finance local projects.  The
cross-country nature of his study, however, does not permit a detailed analysis of the
effects of foreign bank entry in Turkey on important issues such as profitability,
efficiency, market structure and other qualitative impacts.
This paper attempts to analyze some of these issues by testing a number of
hypotheses drawing upon Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt, and Huizinga (1998) and the
3existing literature on the role of foreign banks in developing countries.  In the recent
literature, Levine (1996) points out that foreign bank entry is likely to be beneficial. He
notes that they are likely to offer more sophisticated services and initially focus on
market niches. He argues that this would have positive effects on competition, improve
financial skills and technology, and foster strengthening of supervisory and legal
infrastructure in the recipient country. This view lends support to Gelb and Sagari (1990)
who emphasized the economy-wide resource allocation and efficiency effects of foreign
bank entry.
Empirical studies are not numerous but, as reviewed in Claessens at al (1998),
they point to the beneficial effects of foreign bank entry'.  Claessens et al's  study
analyzes this question in 80 countries, developed and developing, and is the most
comprehensive cross-country study to date. They find that foreign banks have higher
interest rate margins, profitability and tax payments than local banks in developing
countries. In industrialized nations, however, the opposite is true. In this paper, we follow
a similar approach in studying the impact of foreign bank entry into the Turkish banking
market.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section II there is a short
discussion of the macroeconomic setting and how this has affected the financial sector in
Turkey. In section III we provide an overview of developments in the banking sector with
a focus on foreign bank entry, and offer some comparisons between local and foreign
banks.  Section IV presents the empirical models used in the study and estimated results.
Section V provides an assessment of those results, and section VI some conclusions.
4II. MACROECONOMIC SETTING AND THE FINANCIAL SECTOR
The macroeconomic setting in Turkey over the last two decades has been
dominated by chronic fiscal deficits with high and variable inflation, averaging about 70
percent, and relatively high and volatile GDP growth. The main reason for this has been
Turkey's inability to implement the necessary structural reforms which, to date, is still
the case. In 1989, Turkey liberalized its capital account, complicating macroeconomic
management even more. The open capital account established a strong link between
foreign and domestic rates and, given the unstable situation in Turkey, a large risk
premium developed. As a result, domestic interest rates have been, and continue to be
high which, in turn, negatively affects fiscal dynamics 2.
The openness of the economy, with persistent fiscal imbalances, put a premium
on sound exchange rate management. While Turkey has followed a flexible exchange
rate policy since 1980, high inflation and capital inflows caused real exchange rate
appreciation during the 1990-1993  period. This situation provided strong incentives for
external borrowing given the high domestic interest rates and, as expected, commercial
bank borrowing abroad increased rapidly. From being negligible in the 1980s, Turkish
banks' liabilities to non-residents reached almost 13 percent of their total liabilities by
1993.
Further deterioration in the fiscal situation in 1993, and major policy mistakes in
foreign exchange and interest rate policies,  led to a crisis in late 1993. The currency
depreciated by almost 100 percent, three small banks failed and left the system. GDP
Mcfadden (1994) analyzes Australia's experience with foreign bank entry. Bhattacharya (1993) looks at
the cases of  Turkey, Korea, and Pakistan. Pigott (1986). Terrell (1977) considers the cases of 14 developed
countries, of which 8 allowed foreign bank entry.
5contracted by 6 percent in 1994, the biggest drop in modem Turkish history. The ensuing
financial panic, including a run on the larger banks, could only be contained when the
deposit insurance coverage was raised to 100 percent.
Helped by the large depreciation of the currency and a favorable external
environment, Turkey's economy rapidly strengthened in each of the following three years
with growth averaging 7 percent per annum. Fiscal adjustment, however, could not be
achieved.  Given this serious constraint, the Central Bank began to target the real
exchange rate,  which meant depreciating the currency in line with inflation. Given high
domestic rates, the likely path of the exchange rate became predictable and encouraged
foreign borrowing. Banks and other large corporations again began to borrow abroad to
buy high-yield government paper (Celasun et al 1999, Banks Association of Turkey,
BAT 1997).
It is obvious from this summary that commercial banks have been operating in a
difficult environment. Inflation has been high and variable, making it difficult to price
financial assets, thus negatively impacting lending by banks. Bank lending to firms
remained fairly stable between 1985-1995, and in that period loan to total assets ratios in
the sector averaged 45 percent. Foreign banks' loans to total assets ratios have been
consistently lower, about 26 percent on average between 1985-1995. Most of the lending
has been short term, with over 85 percent of the loans having a maturity under one year
and carrying high real interest rates, averaging at least 15-20 percent in the last decade.
Banks have preferred to invest in liquid assets in this volatile environment, most
2 See  Celasun,  Denizer,  and  Dong  (1999)  for  a comprehensive  analysis  of capital  flows,  macroeconomic
management  and  financial  sector issues  in Turkey
6important being the government paper. In 1997, 10 percent of bank assets were in the
form of treasury securities.
Another complication arising from high inflation is that it creates measurement
problems with regard to bank profitability and capital adequacy. With chronic and
volatile inflation, nominal profits do not mean much if the erosion in the value of their
capital is taken into account.  We take this factor into account by adjusting profits for the
loss in the value of bank capital which, of course, reduces their profitability.
III. BANKING MARKET DEVELOPMENTS AND THE ENTRY PROCESS
In this section we provide a review of the banking market in Turkey, focusing on
foreign bank entry, comparative performance of local and foreign banks, market structure
in terms of concentration and some regulatory issues.  Table 1 presents the financial
market composition in Turkey. At the end of 1997 there were 59 commercial banks, 13
investment and development banks, more than 100 brokerage houses, and some sixty-
four insurance companies.  Focusing on the banking sector, it can be seen that since 1980
there has been a significant number of entries and exits. State-owned commercial banks
declined in number from eight in 1980 to four in 1997. This decline has been due to the
privatization or merger of some of the smaller public banks. Private banks increased in
number from 24 in 1980 to 38 as of end of 1997, a net entry of 14.
As can be seen in Table 1, the most significant increase has been in the number of
foreign banks.  In 1980 there were only four foreign banks - by 1990 there were 23. This
number then declined to 17, mostly as a result of some of the foreign  banks merging with
smaller Turkish banks.  This is a net entry of 13 banks almost matching the number of de
novo entries by local banks. Judging by this it seems that relaxing entry barriers
7produced the expected results.  Most of the foreign banks came in the 1980-1985 period
and were owned by large banks of European, United States or Middle Eastern origin.
There were two major reasons for foreign bank entry. The first was that when
Turkey liberalized its economy in the 1  980s, foreign trade was small, exports were about
US$2.9 billion and imports were US$7 billion.  Since then, Turkey's exports and imports
grew rapidly to US$26 billion and US$48 billion in 1997 respectively. The new and
open trade regime required more sophisticated financial services and foreign trade
financing.  In the early 1980s foreign banks came for these reasons and quickly
established themselves serving that niche. They anticipated the needs of Turkish and
foreign companies and saw it as a profitable activity which would generate fee-based
income.
The second reason was that Turkey pressed ahead with liberal policies, opening
its capital account in 1989 and there was no policy reversal. Finally, the expectation that
Turkey would sign a customs union with European Union in 1995 reinforced market
perceptions that Turkey would maintain a liberal policy environment in general.  These
were in addition to relatively rapid economic growth, and Turkey's gateway position with
respect to the CIS countries.
How do these bank groups compare in terms of efficiency, profitability, and
market share? Tables 2 and 3 provide the basic data for a comparative analysis.
Using standard accounting ratios such as ROE (return on equity), ROA (return on assets)
and NIM (net intermediation margin) we see that foreign banks have been highly
profitable. Looking at ROE, they had the best performance with the exception of 1986
and 1996. In terms of ROA, they had the best record and, in all years, had a higher ratio
8than their Turkish counterparts.  In terms of NIM, they have the best record as well.
Figure 1 compares operating expenses between foreign and local banks. As can be seen,
operating expenses of foreign banks start at a higher level than local private banks and
then go hand-in-hand for a while. Foreign banks later reduce their costs below Turkish
banks, but there is a big increase in 1988 and 1989. In the following years, Turkish banks
have higher ratios and there does not seem to be a persistent and clear trend for both
groups.
The evolution of foreign banks' market share in terrns of assets, loans, and
deposits shows that their shares have fluctuated but did not increase over time.  In order
to have a longer-term perspective we extended the analysis back to 1970. In terms of
assets, we see that their share increased from 3.6 percent of total assets to 5 percent in
1997. With respect to loans, there is a decrease compared to the situation in 1970. The
same is also true for deposits, accounting for only 3.4 percent of all deposits in the
banking system. These are interesting results considering the number of entries. There is
no visible increase in their traditional bank outputs and hence shares.
This implies two things.  First, the shares of individual foreign banks relative to
the banking system must be smaller now.  There are more foreign banks but their shares
did not increase proportionally. Second, if this is so, these banks are highly specialized
and service niche areas and their profitability reflects substantial revenues from fee-based
services.
Foreign banks are, in general, smaller than local banks, the largest being the
Ottoman Bank, established in Turkey in 1863, which is not really perceived as a foreign
bank.  Total bank assets were about US$95 billion in 1997, of which US$4.5 billion
9belonged to foreign banks.  Foreign banks have smaller branch networks. Their total
number of branches was about 116 in 1997 of the 6,795 bank branches in Turkey.  Of
this 1 16, almost 70 belong to Ottoman Bank. If the share of this bank is subtracted from
market shares of other foreign banks, the resulting shares would be very small.  This is
another indication that foreign banks are not in the retail banking business. In fact, only
the Ottoman Bank is engaged in retail banking among foreign banks.
However, this does not do justice to their impact on the sector. The competition
in trade finance, corporate finance and, increasingly, in derivatives transactions has been
intense. This where the foreign banks have mostly been operating. This is reflected in
prices paid for fee-based services. As noted by Bhattarcharya (1993), fees on letters of
credit declined from 1.5 percent to 0.5 percent and fees on letters of guarantees fell from
4 percent to 1 percent.  While these reduced fees and commissions were initially only
available to large customers, by 1995 medium sized firms were also enjoying lower rates.
These are important benefits and are a good indicator of the effects of foreign entry,
especially if one considers the rapid growth of Turkey's foreign trade.
What about market structure developments? This is shown to be a significant
determinant of bank profitability in Turkey and hence it needs to be considered (Denizer,
1997, Aydogan 1994). As shown in Table 4, easing of entry restrictions reduced
concentration in the sector. It can be seen that the traditional ratios, and the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index, decline until about 1993 when concentration started to increase again.
The observed declines in various concentration indices were  due to the top 3-5 banks
losing market share, in terms of deposits and loans, to the top 10 banks.
10Foreign banks, as the above analysis indicates, have not been in the retail business
and their impact on concentration has been minimal. While concentration ratios and
indices are lower now than in 1980, this does not necessarily mean the system is more
competitive. An important issue here is the bank branch network of the banks in the
system before 1980. These banks set up their networks when the financial system was
repressed and it was relatively cheap to do so, simply because the price of capital was
distorted. With the freeing of interest rates in 1980 this was corrected, but existing banks
had their large networks by that time giving them advantage over new entrants.  In fact,
branch concentration ratio remained fairly stable For this reason we take market
structure and branch concentration factors into account in the empirical work presented
below.
IV. DATA AND VARIABLES
All bank data used in this study comes from the annual publication of the Banks
Association of  Turkey titled "Banks in Turkey".  This publication includes income
statements, balance sheets and other information on a yearly basis and on every bank
operating in Turkey.
Using this data the following variables were constructed: (i) net interest margin/
total assets, (ii) overhead costs/total assets; and (iii) before tax net income/total assets
average lending rate = interest and non-interest income received.
average loans (after adjusting  for  loan loss provisions).
average deposit rate =  interest  paid/average deposits.
net margin = average lending rate-average deposit rate/total assets (ta).
11Before tax profits/ta = net margin/ta + non-interest income/ta.-
overhead/ta - loan loss provisions/ta.
FNS = number share offoreign banks (number offoreign  banks/total
number of banks).
FMS = market share offoreign banks (assets offoreign  banks/lolal assets
of the banking system).
BRA = bank branch share (number of branches for each bank/tolal
number of branches in the system).
Non-interest is added to account for non-lending activities.  Overhead/ta variable
is all overhead costs including all operating expenses and other expenses.  Two sets of
these independent variables are created. In the first set, these variables are created for all
banks, including the foreign banks, and used in the first set of regressions.  In the second
set, performance measures are entered only for the domestic banks.  The first set is used
to ask: does foreign ownership matter in the determination of performance controlling for
other factors?  The second set is used to ask: what is the impact of foreign bank
penetration on the performance of domestic banks controlling for other factors?
Independent variables include the following:  For the first question we include a
dummy variable, Fl,  if the bank is foreign owned. For the second question, we have two
variables: (i)FNS which is the ratio of number of foreign banks to the ratio of the number
of all banks to understand their impact on the three performance measures given above;
and (ii) FMS, which is the asset share of foreign banks in the system.  Other variables
include, CA(1), which  is the capital asset ratio lagged one period to account for different
levels of risk across banks with low ratios indicating relatively risky positions. DA is
12short and medium term deposits divided by total assets.  Funding from core deposits is
likely to be cheap.  A high ratio would indicate that banks do not need to rely on
purchased funds. As noted by Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1988),  this may require a
large branch network.  As economic growth can affect bank performance we control for
this, and include annual rate of economic growth as one of the regressors.  INF represents
annual inflation rate to take its possible impact on bank performance. As real interest
rates fluctuated significantly, and they have been high (ex-post), we control for this
variable. It is it calculated as: (1 +nominal interest rate/l+inflation  rate)-lX100).
Nominal interest rate is the annualized rate on three-month government paper and this
data was obtained from the Central Bank, as well as the inflation data.  We control for
market structure by including  HHI in the equations.  We also create another variable to
test whether banks with large branch networks have market power.  This variable is BRA
( branch share of each bank in total branches).
V. RESULTS
All three performance measures are estimated using panel data estimation
methods.  We first tested whether explanatory power was improved by having bank-
specific dummy variables.  Once this was tested, we applied the Hausman test to
determine whether fixed effects or random effects estimation would produce greater
efficiency.  We first focused on net interest margins  and the results are presented in
Table 5.  In the first column we investigate whether foreign bank ownership is an
important determinant of this performance indicator. The foreign bank dummy variable
is significant which indicates that foreign ownership matters.  The number share is not
significant, however.  Among variables of interest, it is worth noting DA, which is
13intended to capture whether core deposits, as opposed to borrowed sources of ftunds,
makes a difference.  Results suggest that it does but in a negative way. Higher overheads
increase net interest margin.  It could be that higher interest margin is associated with
large branch networks, high maintenance costs, and large salary expenses.  Growth enters
with a positive sign but it is not significant. Inflation is another significant variable,
which is expected. Higher inflation increases overhead costs and the frequency of
transactions, and banks can benefit from delayed payments to customers in an
inflationary economy like Turkey's.  Real interest variable is not significantly related to
net interest margin.  Finally, we have the market structure variable. The HHI is
significant and positive which suggest that all banks benefit from market concentration.
Using simpler concentration measures does not change the results.  However,
significance level decreases slightly.
The second and third columns test the impact on foreign entry on domestic banks'
net interest margin directly. However, our results show that neither FNS nor FMS are
related to net interest margin in a significant way.  Taken together with the fact that
foreign dummy is significant, this finding suggests that it is not the number of foreign
banks in the system that explains net margins but probably the products and services they
provide, and the way they are managed.  It is interesting to note that bank branch share is
significant in these specifications suggesting that individual banks have some market
power.
Turning to our second performance measure, overheads (OEA), we implement
similar tests.  As shown in the first column in Table 6, foreign ownership is associated
with higher overheads. This is consistent with Claessens et al (1998) who point out
14that foreign banks may have to deal with high information costs. Another aspect of our
finding is that, in Turkey,  foreign banks pay significantly more than local banks and this
increases their operating costs . With the exception of real interest rates, all other
independent variables included in this specification are significant.
What is the impact of foreign entry on overheads? Columns 2 and 3 in Table 6
show that both the FNS and FMS are significant and enter with a negative sign.  This
suggests that the entry of foreign banks have the effect of reducing overhead costs of
domestic banking system.  In tum, this would imply increasing efficiency and resource
utilization. Growth enters with a positive sign and it is significant. Inflation and real
interest are also significant. Market structure is again highly significant. This may
suggest that high concentration is associated with inefficient resource allocation and
inefficiencies in the system reducing the positive impact of FNS and FMS on overheads.
Turning to return on assets (ROA), we perform the same type of analysis. Results
are in Table 7.  The first column shows that foreign ownership is related to ROA
significantly. OEA enters with a positive suggesting that overheads increase ROA, which
is counter intuitive.  DA has a negative effect on ROA and is highly significant. Growth
enters with a positive sign and is significant which is line with our expectations. Both
inflation and real interest rates appear to be positively associated with ROA.  Market
structure and bank branch share variables turn out to be significant once more.
In columns 2 and 3 we use FNS and FMS as foreign bank penetration proxies.
The results show that the foreign bank market share enters with a negative sign but it is
not significant. However, the number share is strongly related to ROA and in a negative
way. This suggests that foreign banks eithance competition and reduce domestic bank
15profitability.  Other independent variables enter more or less with the same sign and
magnitude as in column 1.
In columns 4, 5, and 6 we use an adjusted ROA data to take into account the
impact of inflation on bank profitability.  We reduce nominal profits by the amount of
reduction in real bank capital as a result of inflation. In another words, we keep bank
capital constant in real terms.  As shown in the table, this leads to important differences.
Foreign ownership dummy is still highly significant. However, the real interest variable,
in contrast to earlier results, becomes highly significant. The fact that it enters with a
positive sign suggests that higher real rates of interest increase ROA.  Inflation becomes
insignificant. In columns 5 and 6 we look at the impact of FMS and FNS on the
performance of domestic banks. In contrast to column 2, FMS becomes highly
significant after adjusting ROA for inflation. It enters with a negative sign. The
significance of FNS improves and it also enters with a negative sign.
These findings suggest that foreign bank entry had reduced ROA in the system, an
indication of increased competition in the banking market.
VI. QUALITATIVE  IMPACTS OF FOREIGN  BANK ENTRY
The analysis so far has focused on the quantifiable impact of foreign bank
entry. However, there are qualitative effects as pointed out by Levine (1996). Pehlivanli
(1991), in her assessment of foreign entry during the 1980-1990 period, reports that
foreign banks contributed to the quality of bank management in at least three ways: (i)
planning; (ii) credit evaluation and marketing; and (iii) recruitment.  She points out that
financial and operations planning were not a standard and serious process in Turkey
before the 1980s. Indeed, Turkish banks during the pre-1980 period were characterized
16by financial repression. They projected previous years' accounting performance without
due analysis of market and economic situation. They had all the incentives to expand as
much as possible - collecting cheap deposits and putting them into investments carrying
higher returns. They began to rationalize their branch networks following the
liberalization of interest rates in 1980. For their planning needs, Turkish banks imitated
foreign banks adopting planning, budgeting, and modern management information
systems (MIS). By 1997, MIS investments were a major investment item for TuLkish
banks.
Foreign banks had a strong impact on credit evaluation and marketing. Previously, credit
evaluation was based on personal information of credit officers and what was provided
by the borrowers. There was little attempt to systematically investigate tlhe  borrower
across the banking sector. Most of the banks did not have intelligence units before 1980.
Marketing of financial products and services was not an area of activity of comtmercial
banks in the pre-liberalization period.  Banks were accustomed to waiting for loan
appl.cations and for other services they could offer.
When Citibank came in 1981 and started to operate with a  structure that included
marketing departments, it attracted new business from Turkish blue chip companies.
This forced domestic banks to set up their own marketing units and most banks have such
units now.
Recruitment and staff quality increased significantly after 1980. Foreign banks
offered higher salaries and other incentives to attract well-trained college graduates.
They developed training programs and often sent locally recruited staff to their training
centers abroad. Under Citibank leadership, a banking school was established which is
17still in operation.  The ratio of university graduates to total employment in the sector rose
from 10 percent in 1980 to 36 percent by the end of 1997. This ratio was the highest in
foreign banks, about 61 percent, followed by private banks at 45 percent and state banks
at 27 percent.  More recently, the trend has been towards hiring MBAs, and both foreign
and local banks are actively competing for well-trained graduates.
There have been technological and electronic banking developments as well.
While this is a global phenomenon, not directly attributable to foreign bank entry alone,
foreign banks initially took the lead in this area.  Almost all Turkish banks now have in-
line connections with their branch networks which reduces transaction costs and saves
time.  The number of ATMs is increasing rapidly. By the end of 1997 there were more
than 6,500 ATM locations. Point of sales (POS) is also increasing and, at the end of 1997,
this number stood at almost 60,000. The number of credit cards has been increasing at a
very rapid rate and, in terms of new card issues, Turkey was leading Europe in 1997.
Total number of cards was almost 5 million at the end of 1997, (TBA, 1997).
VII. CONCLUSIONS
There has been a record number of foreign and local bank entries into tlhe  Turkish
banking sector following the relaxation of bank entry, elimination of controls on interest
rates and financial intermediation in general in 1980. This despite high and volatile
inflation which dominated the macroeconomic scene in Turkey. The country's financial
integration with the rest of the world took a big step with the opening up of the capital
account in 1989, and capital inflows increased significantly. The financial system
became increasingly linked with external markets.
18Our objective in this study has been to examine one dimension of this
liberalization process, namely the impact of foreign bank entry into the financial sector.
Available data shows that foreign bank entry continued steadily through tlle 1  980s,
peaking at 23 in 1990 from four in 1980. Together with 13 new local bank entries, the
total number in the sector reached 56 in 1990. In the following years, some foreign banks
merged with each other or with local banks. By the end of 1997 there had been 17 net
foreign bank entries since 1980.
Our formal analysis focused on three performance measures: net interest
margin; overhead expenses; and return on assets; all expressed as a percentage of total
assets. We first examined whether foreign ownership made a difference controlling for a
number of factors used in the literature.  We found that foreign bank ownership is related
to all three performance measures. Our more direct examination of the effects of foreign
bank entry on domestic bank performance shows that foreign bank entry, in general,
produced the expected beneficial results.  Our results show that foreign bank entry had
the effect of reducing overhead expenses of domestic commercial banks.  When return on
assets was adjusted for the effects of inflation on profits and bank capital, we found that
the impact of foreign bank entry on profits get stronger.  Both measures of foreign bank
penetration were negatively related to return on assets. This indicates that foreign bank
entry had a strong competitive effect in Turkey despite the fact that the scale of their
operations has been small.  This result also shows that nominal profits and bank capital
need adjustment in high inflation environments.
While foreign ownership was related to net interest margin, foreign bank
penetration measures were not.  Market structure has been an important factor in the
19explanation  of all performance  measures  used in this study  and this suggests  that the
market  could benefit from more  competition.
We also reviewed  the qualitative  aspects  of foreign  bank entry. We found  that
foreign  banks contributed  to the financial  sector's development  in various ways,
especially  in financial  and operations  planning,  credit  analysis  and marketing,  and human
capital. While  these benefits  can not all be attributed  to foreign  bank entry, and while
this is a multifaceted  issue, there are strong  indications  that foreign  banks  had a positive
impact  in these areas.
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21Table  I
Number  of Firms
Commercial Banks
Year  State-  Private  Foreign  Total  Investment  &  Individual  Brokerage  Insurance  Companies
Owned  Development  Broker-  Houses
Banks  Dealers
1980  8  24  4  36  2  ...  ...  ...
1981  8  24  6  38  2  ...  ...
1982  8  24  9  41  2  ..  ...
1983  8  19  10  37  2  ...  ...  ...
1984  8  19  13  40  2  ...  ...  ...
1985  8  20  15  43  2  ...  ...  ...
1986  8  24  17  49  6  8  11  ...
1987  9  24  17  50  6  15  16  ...
1988  8  26  19  53  8  18  18  ...
1989  8  24  21  53  9  22  20  ...
1990  8  25  23  56  10  17  48  42
1991  8  26  21  55  10  ...  110  46
1992  6  31  20  57  12  112  49
1993  6  32  20  58  12  ...  112  52
1994  6  29  20  55  12  ...  111  53
1995  ...  ...  -.  ...  ...  103  ...
1996  5  34  17  56  13  ...  100  ...
1997  4  38  17  59  13  ...  64
Source:The  Banks'  Association  of  Turkey  for  bank  data,  Istanbul  stock  exchange  for brokage  data  and  treasury  for  insurance
data.
22Table  2
Return  on Equity,  Return  on  Assets  and Net  Margin
(in  percent)
Retum  on  Return  on  Net interest  margin
equity  asset
1980
State-Owned  Banks  12.14  1.51  3.41
Private  Banks  68.25  1.03  4.25
Foreign  Banks  204.20  2.54  3.95
1983
State-Owned  Banks  5.17  0.71  1.42
Private  Banks  28.88  1.10  1.22
Foreign  Banks  111.07  3.88  2.58
1986
State-Owned  Banks  18.96  1.51  1.93
Private  Banks  79.14  2.12  2.03
Foreign  Banks  58.05  3.15  3.02
1990
State-Owned  Banks  55.35  1.89  4.45
Private  Banks  19.77  2.88  5.88
Foreign  Banks  56.18  3.62  8.66
1993
State-Owned  Banks  75.98  2.48  7.54
Private  Banks  74.62  2.88  8.51
Foreign  Banks  76.71  4.19  11.82
1996
State-Owned  Banks  42.05  0.66  4.86
Private  Banks  107.67  4.20  9.40
Foreign  Banks  78.69  5.40  12.09
Source:  The Banks  Association  of Turkey.
23Table 3
Share  of Banking  Market
% of total  Assets  Loans  Deposits
1970
State-owned  Banks  60.3  54.6  39.5
Private  Banks  36.0  41.8  56.4
Foreign  Banks  3.6  3.6  4.1
1975
State-owned  Banks  50.3  50.5  35.2
Private  Banks  46.1  46.2  61.2
Foreign  Banks  3.6  3.3  3.5
1980
State-owned  Banks  49.3  53.4  34.0
Private  Banks  47.6  44.4  63.7
Foreign  Banks  3.1  2.2  2.3
1985
State-owned  Banks  47.7  48.0  41.9
Private  Banks  48.4  48.2  55.3
Foreign  Banks  3.8  3.8  2.7
1990
State-owned  Banks  49.9  46.3  48.6
Private  Banks  46.3  50.1  49.0
Foreign  Banks  3.8  3.6  2.4
1994
State-owned  Banks  44.3  44.3  44.6
Private  Banks  52.3  53.6  53.4
Foreign  Banks  3.4  2.1  1.9
1995
State-owned  Banks  40.7  44.1  43.3
Private  Banks  56.2  53.8  54.0
Foreign  Banks  3.1  2.1  2.7
1996
State-owned  Banks  40.7  38.9  44.1
Private  Banks  56.1  59.1  53.4
Foreign  Banks  3.2  1.9  2.5
1997
State-owned  Banks  36.5  37.7  39.9
Private  Banks  58.5  59.3  56.7
Foreign  Banks  5.0  3.0  3.4
Source:  The  Banks  Association  of Turkey
24TABLE  4
Number  of Commercial  Banks  and Measures  of Concentration
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994
Concentration Measures (in percent)
CR(3) ASSETS  50.54  48.61  50.43  52.21  52.27  49.70  47.81  45.94  44.25  44.74  42.70  40.60  40.59  38.81  39.32
CR(5) ASSETS  63.97  62.41  62.88  63.89  64.54  64.56  62.17  60.71  60.21  57.93  56.18  54.28  53.10  52.61  54.81
CR(10) ASSETS  82.97  81.89  82.34  82.13  82.65  83.20  81.39  79.32  80.92  79.75  78.88  77.37  76.58  75.59  80.34
CR(3) DEPOSIT  53.79  51.37  55.69  56.75  58.08  54.49  53.04  49.58  47.41  46.84  43.34  39.77  42.78  41.42  40.66
CR(5) DEPOSIT  70.17  69.22  70.09  70.63  71.63  69.70  67.96  64.11  63.98  61.86  59.12  55.22  57.42  55.07  57.27
CR(10) DEPOSIT  89.24  87.25  88.25  88.16  88.39  87.54  85.93  84.30  85.95  84.79  84.83  82.23  82.81  81.14  83.65
CR(3)  BRANCH  42.18  41.21  40.85  42.26  42.51  42.91  42.84  43.20  43.48  43.50  44.04  44.98  47.03  46.61  47.31
CR(5)  BRANCH  61.76  60.57  60.02  61.61  61.79  61.97  61 67  61.83  61.94  61.98  61.93  62.09  63.41  62.52  62.25
CR(10)  BRANCH  84 88  84.09  83.28  85.13  85.04  85.00  84.54  84.74  86.75  86.86  86.57  86.15  86.89  85.32  84.70
HHIASSETS  11.70  10.87  10.74  12.26  12.23  11.36  10.79  10.21  9.63  9.79  9.09  8.40  8.46  8.06  8.55
HHI BRANCH  9.51  9.22  9.08  9.57  9.63  9.67  9.58  9.67  9.89  9.90  9.92  10.04  10.51  10.29  10.32
HHI DEPOSIT  12.26  11.69  13.01  13.58  14.02  12.95  12.34  11.08  10.77  10.91  10.06  8.79  9.50  9.19  9.40
Source: The Banks' Association of Turkey and own calculations.
Note: CR(x)= x bank concentration ratio, HHI= Herfindahl Index.Table  5
Net Interest  Margin  Results
Estimation  Methods:  Fixed  Effects
(1)  (2)  (3)
Fl  0,005
(2,20)




CA  0.39  (.42)  0.07
LA  0.020  0.024  0.039
(1.94)  (1.98)  (1.24)
DA  -0.06  -0.004  -0.002
(-3.21)  (-3.34)  (-2.01)
OEA  -0.431  -0.532  -0.631
(-2.92)  (-3.34)  (-3.24)
GR  0.091  0.115  0.107
(1.44)  (1.91)  (1.32)
INF  0.421  0.385  0.1971
(2.64)  (2.79)  (1.98)
RI  0 059  0.031  0.0285
(0.68)  (0.49)  (0.74)
HHI  0.231
(2.57)
BRA  0.641  0.871
(1.98)  (2.07)
Adj. R2  0.45  0.40  0.39
26Table  6
Overhead  Expenses  Results
Estimation Method: Random Effects
(1)  (2)  (3)
Fl  0.094
(1.92)




CA  0.59  0.77  0.79
(1.88)  (1.95)  (1.89)
LA  -0.044  -0.021  -0.034
(-1.99)  (-1.34)  (-1.89)
DA  0.033  0.029  0.037
(2.22)  (2.04)  (2.12)
GR  0.0617  0.057  0.062
(1.72)  (1.98)  (1.97)
INF  0.34  0.42  0.36
(2.23)  (2.12)  (2.44)
RI  -0.25  -0.32  -0.27
(-0.74)  (-0.95)  (-0.77)
HHI  0.092
(2.72)
BRA  0.072  0.81
I____________  __  |  1(2.34)  (2.21)
Adj. R2  0.38  X  0.31  0.36
27Table  7
Return on Assets Results
Estimation Method:  Random  Effects
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Fl  0,005  0.041
(2,20)  (2.62)
FNS  0.18  -0.032  0.012  -0.27
(1.32)  (-2.12)  (1.09)  (-2.52)
FMS  -0.32  -0.44
(-1.22)  (-1.96)
CA  0.123  0.164  0.07  0.323  0.271  0.38
(1.52)  (1.44)  (2.35)  (1.88)  (1.90)
LA  0.020  0.062  0.039  0.371  0.032  0.041
(1.94)  (2.01)  (1.24)  (1.05)  (1.21)  (1.37)
DA  -0.044  -0.004  -0.002  -0.174  -0.321  -0.39
(1.97)  (-3.34)  (-2.01)  (-3.12)  (-2.72)  (-2.27)
GR  -0.07  -0.067  0.107  0.136  0.171  0.196
(-1.99)  (-2.12)  (1.32)  (1.25)  (1.42)  (1.74)
OEA  0.03  0.04  0/07  0.069  0.057
(2.02)  (1.98)  (2.21)  (2.42)  (2.34)
INF  0.033  0.047  0.1971  0.39  0.31  0.52
(1.89)  (2.00)  (1.98)  (1.27)  (1.25)  (1.65)
RINT  0.45  0.67  0.0285  0.27  0.02  0.028
(1.62)  (1.89)  (0.74)  (3.02)  (2.17)  (2.25)
HHI  0.019  0.034
(2.42)  (2.32)
BRA  0.048  0.061  0,033  0.039
(2.33)  (1.94)  (2.27)  (2.30)
Adj. R2  _  0.47  _  0.52  0.44  0.52  0.47  0.51
28FIGURE  1
Net Interest Margins and Operating Expenses Evolution
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